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Recent Developments 
SEC RELAXES INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR RESALES 
OF RESTRICTED SECURITIES UNDER RULE 144 
T
he Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), which has broad 
powers to promulgate rules under 
the Securities Act of 1933 (Act), re-
cently amended Rule 144 to allow re-
sales of unregistered securities by bona 
fide investors. Securities Act Release 
No. 33-6488 (Sept. 23,1983) amending 
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k) (1983). The 
"safe harbor" resale under Rule 144 is 
a means of reselling unregistered 
securities under the Act's exemption 
for non-underwriter transactions. Se-
curities Act § 4(1),15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) 
( 1982). The Act requires that all securi-
ties transactions must be registered. 
Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.c. § 77e 
(1982). However, certain securities and 
certain types of securities transactions 
are exempted from registration. One 
exemption applies to transactions by 
any person other than an issuer, 
underwriter or dealer. Securities Act 
§4(1), 15 U.S.c. § 77d(l) (1982). Since 
most people are not issuers, under-
writers or dealers, this exemption 
appears to be broad enough to allow 
ordinary people to resell securities 
without worrying about § 5 registration 
requirements. However, a close study 
of § 4(1) reveals that this conclusion is 
incorrect. 
The Act's definition of "underwriter" 
includes many people who would not 
ordinarily consider themselves to be 
underwriters. An "underwriter" is 
defined as a person who: 
[ 1] has purchased from an issuer 
with a view to, or [2] offers or 
sells for an issuer in connection 
with, [3] the distribution of any 
security, or [4] participates or has 
a direct or indirect participation 
in any such undertaking, or par-
ticipates or has a participation in 
the direct or indirect underwriting 
of any such undertaking; but [5] 
such term shall not include a 
person whose interest is limited to 
a commission from an underwriter 
or dealer not in excess of the usual, 
and customary distributors' or 
sellers' commission. [6] As used 
in this paragraph the term "issuer" 
shall include, in addition to an 
issuer, any person directly or 
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indirectly controlling or controlled 
by the issuer, or any person under 
direct or indirect common control 
with the issuer. 
Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77b(11) (1982). The SEC has used 
the opaque language of this definition 
to regulate: (1) the secondary distribution 
of unregistered or "restricted" securities 
by their original purchasers, whomever 
they are; and (2) distributions of both 
restricted and non-restricted securities 
by control persons or "affiliates" of the 
issuer of the securities. The SEC 
regards "affiliates" as underwriters 
under § 2( 11), thereby denying them 
the § 4( 1) exemption and subjecting 
their transactions to the § 5 registration 
requirement. Securities Act § 2( 11); 
Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(I) 
(1983). A person reselling securities is 
not an underwriter, however, unless the 
resale qualifies as a "distribution." Id. 
The term "distribution" is not 
defined in the Securities Act, but it has 
been the subject of administrative and 
judicial interpretations. There are two 
types of distributions: primary and 
secondary. A primary distribution is 
ordinarily a public offering in which 
securities are registered with the SEC 
and then sold to the general public 
through professional underwriters, bro-
kers and dealers. The registration 
process ostensibly mandates disclosure 
of information material to the public's 
investing decisions. Theoretically, man-
datory disclosure puts the public on an 
informational level with the corporate 
issuer and the seller. 
Problems can arise, however, when 
the owner of restricted securities wants 
to resell them. This resale, known as 
"secondary distribution," presents two 
choices for the seller: (1) he may 
register the securities under the Act or 
(2) he may seek to qualify the resale 
under another transactional exemption. 
If, however, he is an affiliate of the 
issuer, he may be deemed to be an 
issuer or an underwriter (even if the 
securities are registered) and the resale 
may be deemed to be a "distribution" 
subject to SEC regulation. The affiliate 
seller, therefore, must find a safe 
manner of disposing of his securltles 
and avoiding underwriter status, no 
matter what type of securities of the 
issuer he is selling. 
Rule 144 defines persons deemed not to 
be engaged in a distribution for the 
purposes of qualifying for the § 4( 1) 
non-underwriter exemption. Application 
of Rule 144 requires a two-step 
analysis: (1) is the person an affiliate or 
a non-affiliate?; and (2) are the securities 
restricted or non-restricted? If all of the 
conditions of Rule 144 are satisfied, the 
resale will not constitute a distribution, 
and the reseller will not be considered 
an underwriter under § 2( 11) of the 
Act. 
Rule 144 imposes various disclosure, 
holding periods, volume, manner of 
sales and notice requirements. Although 
the scope of Rule 144 is broad, certain 
key features can be noted. Resales by 
non-affiliates are regulated by Rule 144 
only to the extent that the securities are 
restricted, as defined in 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.144 (a)(3)(1983). Rule 144 allows 
non-affiliates who have held securities 
for more than three years and have not 
been affiliates within three months 
prior to the sale to sell their securities 
without the notice, volume limits, or 
manner-of-sale limitations to which 
regular Rule 144 sales are subject. Id. 
§ 230.144(k). 
continued on page 7 
DEBTORS' RIGHTS 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland has clarified the "reasonable 
notification" a debtor must receive 
before a secured creditor can sell 
repossessed collateral to satisfy a debt. 
In DiDomenico v. First National Bank of 
Maryland, __ Md. App. __ , 468 
A.2d 1046 (1984), the court reversed a 
judgment in favor of First National 
Bank of Maryland in the amount of 
$ 7 ,5 23 .89 plus $961.26 in attorneys' 
fees on the grounds that the bank's 
notice to the defaulting debtor failed to 
inform him that he had the right to 
redeem his property at any time up 
until the time the bank sold or 
otherwise disposed of it. MD. COM. 
LAW CODE ANN. (Maryland Uniform 
Commercial Code) § 9-504 (1975 & 
Supp. 1983). In so holding, the court 
relied on Maryland National Bank v. 
Wathen, 288 Md. 119,414 A.2d 1261 
(1980), in which the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland recognized the interrela-
tion of §§ 9-504 and 9-506 of the 
Maryland Uniform Commercial Code. 
The controversy in DiDomenico arose 
out of the bank's suit against Di-
Domenico for a deficiency judgment to 
collect the unpaid balance due under 
the terms of a purchase money security 
agreement entered into by DiDomenico 
to finance the purchase of a mobile 
home. After being laid off, DiDomenico 
fell behind in his payments and 
authorized the bank to repossess the 
mobile home in which he was then 
residing. The notice of repossession, 
which DiDomenico received several 
days after being recalled to work, stated 
in pertinent part: 
You are entitled to redeem the 
said good provided that within 
fifteen days from the date of 
delivery of this notice you pay .. . 
$650.39 [the amount then due ] .. .. 
If you do not redeem as aforesaid, 
the goods will thereafter be sold at 
a private sale and if a deficiency 
arises, you will be liable. 
Similar language appeared in an earlier 
notice of default received by DiDomenico. 
The earlier notice stated that in the 
event of repossession, "your right to 
this vehicle will be terminated fifteen 
days from the date... our notice of 
repossession is delivered to you ... ," but 
that "[p ]rior to the expiration of the 
fifteen day interval, you may redeem 
the vehicle .... " DiDomenico never 
redeemed the mobile home and the 
bank eventually sold it. 
The notices which DiDomenico re-
ceived gave him only fifteen days in 
which to redeem his property. Under 
§ 9-506 of the Maryland Uniform Com-
mercial Code, however, debtors have 
the right to redeem collateral "[a]t any 
time before the secured party has 
disposed of [it] or entered into a 
contract for its disposition ... or before 
the obligation has been discharged .... " 
Accordingly, DiDomenico argued that 
the notice of repossession was "unrea-
sonable" because it was "misleading" 
and tended to discourage him from 
exercising his right to redeem his 
property before sale. 
The court agreed and reversed the 
lower court's judgment, holding that 
the bank's notice was inadequate under 
§ 9-504(3), which requires "reasonable 
notification" by the secured creditor to 
the defaulting debtor of the time and 
place of public sale or the time after 
which any private sale or other 
disposition of the collateral is to be 
made. Section 9-504(3), the court 
noted, must be read together with § 9-
506, in keeping with the 1980 Wathen 
decision, in which the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland recognized the "interrela-
tion" of the two provisions. 
The bank defended its judgment on 
the grounds that its notice was suffi-
cient under §§ 12-624 and 12-625 of 
the Maryland Uniform Commercial 
Code, also known as the Retail 
Installment Sales Act. The court was 
continued on page 7 
DISCOVERY ABUSE 
Abuse of discovery procedures in the 
federal courts has resulted in changes to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 
which became effective on August 1, 
1983. 69 A.B.A.J. 1640 (1983). A 
major revision to Rule 26 curtails 
repetitive discovery by deleting the 
provision permitting "unlimited use" 
of the various discovery methods. Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Judges can now 
limit discovery if it is determined that: 
(i) the discovery sought is unrea-
sonable, cumulative or duplica-
tive, or is obtainable from 
some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, 
or less expensive; 
(ii) the party seeking discovery has 
had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to 
obtain information sought; or 
(iii) the discovery is unduly bur-
densome or expensive, taking 
into account the needs of the 
case, the amount in contro-
versy, limitations on the parties' 
resources, and the importance 
of the issues at stake in the 
litigation .... 
Id.; 97 F.RD. 213, 214 (1983). 
This change was "designed to mini-
mize redunancy in discovery and to 
encourage attorneys to be sensitive to 
the comparative costs of different 
methods of securing information." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note. 
It will also aid judges in their attempts 
to stop the "games" played by the 
attorneys who can afford the paper, the 
word processors and the time to 
barrage opposing counsel with discovery. 
Another change to Rule 26 is that 
every discovery request, response or 
objection must be signed by an attorney 
or by an unrepresented party. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(g). The signature constitutes 
certification that the attorney has read 
the request, response or objection and 
that to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief, formed after a 
reasonable inquiry, the request is: 
(1) consistent with these rules and 
warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law; 
(2) not interposed for any im-
proper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation; and 
(3) not unreasonable or unduly 
burdensome or expensive, given 
the needs of the case, the 
discovery already had in the 
case, the amount in controversy, 
and the importance of the 
issues at stake in the litigation. 
Id.; 97 F.RD. 213, 215 (1983). 
The new certification requirement 
places a duty on the attorney or 
unrepresented party to make a reason-
able inquiry into the appropriateness of 
the discovery request or response. In 
making the inquiry, "the attorney may 
rely on assertions by the client and on 
communications with other counsel in 
the case as long as that reliance is 
appropriate under the circumstances." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee 
note. The gist of the certification 
requirement is to require attorneys to 
stop and think about the legitimacy of a 
discovery request, response or objec-
tion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory 
committee note. Amended Rule 26 
encourages judicial participation in 
deterring discovery abuse and places a 
duty on attorneys to use caution in 
seeking discovery. 
In Baltimore City, Judge Joseph 1. 
Pines, discovery judge of the Circuit 
Court, has begun attaching one-page 
notices to his discovery orders. The 
notices state, "I am herewith advising 
counsel of my intention to vigorously 
exercise the options available to me to 
insure the proper use of discovery 
procedures in accordance with the 
dictates of the Maryland Rules of 
Procedure!" The Daily Record, Jan. 26, 
1984, at 1, col. 1. Judge Pines' effort to 
deter discovery abuse in Baltimore's 
legal community is consistent with the 
policies expressed in the amended 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. 
Discovery was designed to aid lawyers 
in simplifying litigation, not to create 
unnecessary delay and complications. 
This is the message being disseminated 
in the Federal courts and in Baltimore 
City. W 
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SEC Relaxes Rule 144 
continued from page 4 
In the past, a non~affiliate could also 
resell restricted securities through Rule 
237 of the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.237 (1983), which provided an 
exemption and "safe~harbor" resale 
provision for any person other than the 
issuer, an affiliate, or a broker/dealer 
selling certain securities owned for 
more than five years. Rule 237 had 
volume restrictions, which were reduced 
by aggregations from other sales within 
one year, and required a notice filing. 
Rule 237, however, did not require that 
current information be available con~ 
cerning the securities, as does Rule 144. 
The resale limitations imposed on 
small business securities and "the 
current status of problems and pro~ 
grams relating to small business capital 
formation" prompted Congress in 
1980 to direct the SEC to conduct an 
annual Government~Business Forum. 
Small Business Investment Incentive 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 97~477 
§ 503(a), 94 Stat. 2275,2292 (1980). 
At the first meeting, the participants 
felt that certain provisions of Rule 144 
tended to deter investment in small 
business. In particular, the participants 
voiced their discontent with issuers' 
current information requirements, and 
recommended that Rule 144 be amended 
to allow non~affiliates to freely resell 
restricted securities after a holding 
period of three years. SEC Government/ 
Business Forum on Small Business 
Capital Formation, Final Report at 53 
(Nov. 1982). 
In response, the SEC proposed in 
Securities Release No. 33~6472 (July 8, 
1983) to revise Rule 144 by dropping 
the current information requirements 
and rescinding Rule 237 and Form 237. 
The SEC suggested that, since a 
nonaffiliate who has held restricted 
securities for three years would probably 
not have bought his secuntles 
from the issuer with a view toward 
distribution, he should not be con~ 
side red an "underwriter." Thus, a rule 
requiring nonaffiliates to wait until 
information about the issuer is available 
or requiring the issuer to disseminate 
the information himself would be 
unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the 
SEC implemented the proposed Forum 
changes in Securities Act Release No. 
33~6488 (September 23, 1983), effec~ 
tive October 31, 1983. The informa~ 
tional requirements were dropped from 
Rule 144, and the purpose of Rule 237 
was subsumed in Rule 144, making 
Rule 237 unnecessary. 
Rule 144, as amended, will benefit 
both non~affiliate investors and issuers 
of restricted securities by allowing 
secondary distributions of securities to 
be made more easily. Although the 
amended Rule may benefit capital 
formation and assist small business, the 
elimination of mandatory disclosure 
requirements may subvert the purposes 
of the Securities Act. Mandatory 
disclosure of material information helps 
the investor to make an informed 
decision. Under the amended Rule, an 
investor may purchase in a secondary 
distribution a restricted security that 
has been held for three years (and has 
not been held by an affiliate within the 
last three months), and about which no 
current public information may be 
available. 
This change in Rule 144 amounts to 
failure by the SEC to enforce the 
mandatory disclosure requirements of 
the Securities Act. By amending Rule 
144, the SEC has delegated the process 
of ensuring material disclosure in such 
secondary distributions to the states, 
which will have to ensure adequate 
disclosure through their blue sky laws if 
investors are to be provided with the 
information they need to make in~ 
formed decisions. States, by and large, 
do not regulate secondary transactions, 
so one might argue that this SEC action 
fails to reflect the legislative intent 
underlying federal securities regulation, 
which is investor protection. See Seligman, 
The Historical Need for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1,57-61 
(1983). 
One expert explains the SEC's 
partiality to small business as a mandate 
from the President and Congress and 
maintains that the SEC has a duty to 
assist capital formation. See R. Karmel, 
Regulation by Prosecution 281 ~89 ( 1982). 
Since the SEC's statutory mandate 
is protection of investors, not business, 
it seems the liberalization of Rule 144 is 
self~defeating. 
It is unclear at this time whether 
more securities fraud will result from 
the relaxation of current information 
requirements in Rule 144. But deregu~ 
lation is de rigeur these days, and the 
SEC is, because of its nature as an 
executive agency, politically influenced. 
A cost/benefit analysis is necessary to 
determine whether the benefits to small 
business from the deregulation of 
current information requirements out~ 
weigh the costs of fraud and deceit 
upon innocent investors. 
Debtors' Rights 
continued from page 5 
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not persuaded, however, and found 
that since the bank was not the seller of 
the mobile home, its reliance on the 
Retail Installment Sales Act was mis~ 
placed. Accordingly, the court reversed 
the lower court's judgment in favor of 
the bank and remanded the case for 
further proceedings on DiDomenico's 
counterclaim for statutory damages 
brought under § 9~507( 1) of the 
Maryland Uniform Commercial Code. 
The bank has filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari to have the case reviewed by 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Its 
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